KONG Next Phase: Sunrise

[Digit]

Here’s a cleaned-up and lightly tightened version of your proposal, formatted in Markdown so it’s easy to drop into a forum or doc. I’ve preserved your tone, but removed redundancies, smoothed grammar, and made the structure clearer.

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Proposal: Next Steps for KONG Land

With the Sunset Resolution failing to pass, it’s time to determine our path forward.

Here are the two main areas for exploration:

Ragequit Mechanism – A method for dissatisfied citizens to burn their token and receive their pro rata share of the treasury.

Mission Refinement – Clear goals and a roadmap for the DAO, including plans to use at least 60% of the treasury over the next 12 months toward KONG Land’s mission, strategies to generate revenue, and explicit metrics to measure success.

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Treasury & Membership

We need to decide whether our default state is “stay in” or “leave”, as well as what proportion each member would receive:

• Default Leave: Airdrop each member their share of the treasury unless they explicitly opt in to remain in the DAO. Benefit: Ensures that remaining members are active and willing to contribute.
• Default Stay: Implement a ragequit mechanism, where members who wish to exit burn their token in exchange for their share of the treasury.

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Mission Refinement

Here’s a list of initiatives I’d like to see as next steps.

For context, almost all active DAO development/design/management to date has been between @cameron and myself. I’d like to create an environment where more members are provided the opportunity to take on active roles.

Chips

• Scripts: We (@cameron) to complete current work on scripts, working out some kinks to allow for the following “Frontend” work.
• Frontend: A volunteer to build a simple, approachable frontend for the scripts (funded by the treasury) —inputs, dropdowns, and clear UX—to let anyone quickly get started with KONG Chips. This would be a huge unlock.
• Arx Research: As a chip provider, Arx to resell chips to KONG Land at a significant discount.
• KONG Land Chip Dept: DAO members would have the ability to sell chips on behalf on KONG Land, keeping a portion of profits, with the remainder returning to KONG Land to generate ongoing revenue for the DAO.

Beyond Chips

• Treasury Strategy: Explore putting ETH in the treasury to work, seeking yield opportunities instead of holding it idle.
• Network State: Continue exploring the “network state” concept, with open discussion on how KONG Land could fit into this vision.

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Closing

This proposal is meant to kick off conversation and outline rough ideas—not present a finished plan.

Feedback, additions, and alternative suggestions are encouraged.

[fubuloubu]

@Digit

Default Leave: Airdrop each member their share of the treasury unless they explicitly opt in to remain in the DAO. Benefit: Ensures that remaining members are active and willing to contribute.

This sort of sounds like a version of the original Proposal for Dissolution (which did not pass), and it beleaguers the question of how to compute such an airdrop distribution fairly.

I support keeping it simple using the original proposed ragequit mechanism (1 NFT = 1 share of assets) so we do not have to continue to vote on more complex mechanisms, merkle tree data collection, etc.

[rj1708]

Default Leave: Airdrop each member their share of the treasury unless they explicitly opt in to remain in the DAO. Benefit: Ensures that remaining members are active and willing to contribute.

“Leave” should not be the default. A majority of holders voted not to dissolve and to implement a ragequit mechanism for those who want to leave. Not a rageremain mechanism. To me, a default leave runs against the language of the resolution. The membership is what it is and part of the efforts over the next 12 months should be to find ways to get more people involved.

Also, there was a discussion in Discord about allowing people to convert the NFT back to the ERC20, which I support. I actually support any mechanism that makes it straightforward for people to quit with 1 NFT = 1 ragequit (1/totalSupply ETH).

In terms of Mission Refinement, the Snapshot language is:

Mission refinement: Ex. Clear goals and a path forward established for the DAO, plans to use at least 60% of the treasury over the next 12 months towards KONG Lands mission, and/or a way to generate revenue for the DAO and the establishment of explicit metrics to evaluate success.

In my view, this breaks down to the following:

• Clear goals and a path forward established for the DAO;
• Plans to use at least 60% of the treasury over the next 12 months towards KONG Lands mission; and/or
• A way to generate revenue for the DAO; and
• The establishment of explicit metrics to evaluate success.

The clear goals and path forward should help to inform the other pieces of this. @digit has already put forward great ideas on initiatives that could get more people involved and generate revenue for the DAO.

• I’m curious whether the Frontend proposal could include a percentage of each sale that goes to the DAO?
• It seems that a plan to place at least a portion of the treasury in some type of yield-generating protocol would be one way to begin satisfying the way to generate revenue. The Snapshot does not require that the DAO both use 60% of the treasury and generate revenue. The DAO can, but only one is required per the and/or language.
• Arx Research: Are there other ways that the DAO can interface with the work Arx is doing?
  • Significantly discounted chips for Kong members who are developing chipped projects? (benefit of membership and encourages creation of chipped and on-chain experiments)
  • Running validation mechanism for chips? I’m just curious if there’s a way for KongLand DAO to tie into the validation process, or if this is even desirable.
  • Creating guides for regular (end) users of chips? It seems like there is something of a “KongUniverse” that includes Arx, ERS, etc. It would be really interesting if we could have all of this info in one place, which includes simple instructions for end-users of chips. The Arx website is great and includes lots of detail for buidlers, but the Discord has lots of examples of issues people have run into scanning or otherwise using chips.
• ERS: How might the DAO interface/be involved with ERS?
  • Creating some type of transfer validation service so people can trade/sell chipped goods on a secondary market? Similar to StockX? There is a lot of friction around the resale of physical, chipped goods because you’re basically transferring physical/digital assets.
  • Are there other ways the DAO might expand/complement the work?
• Discord: A few ideas about getting Discord more active.
  • DAO members could have moderator roles in Discord to trouble-shoot questions that chip buidlers and users inevitably have.
  • We should also have some sort of AI-agent that can summarize any future community calls and Senate meetings and make that immediately available to DAO members.
  • We should have more general announcements when chips are used in different projects, or other milestones occur.
• We should look at ways to compensate work by DAO members for engaging in these (and other) activities. For example, running a validator accrues rewards. Launching a new project/use for chips accrues rewards. Those rewards might be used to repurchase chips - I really don’t know on the economics of this, but there should be some use case for the $LAND token, for example, that ties into this. I do think we need to really try to pick up on as many threads as we can to continue the work that the Senate and key contributors have done, to date.

[Sacris]

Ragequit Mechanism – A method for dissatisfied citizens to burn their token and receive their pro rata share of the treasury.

Default stay for this makes the most sense and seems most favorable based off the previous discussion post. How we handle it and if we do 1 NFT = 1 ragequit (1/totalSupply ETH) I think should be discussed in-depth more. Some factors that would impact the share could include:

• Does $CITIZEN have an Alpha NFT or burned from $CTZN?

• Does $CITIZEN have a special discord role? i.e. Guardian of KONG (Gok)

• Does $CITIZEN hold POAPs from our previous community calls/events? How many?

• Has $CITIZEN voted on previous Snapshot proposals? How many?

Otherwise you put those who bought an NFT and never joined the Discord on the same level as those who contributed within the DAO. Sure it’s easier to do 1 NFT = 1 equal share but being the DAO 3+ years old, there has definitely been a number of $CITIZENs who have contributed and this would be a very basic yet logical way of separating them from non-contributors.

Mission Refinement – Clear goals and a roadmap for the DAO, including plans to use at least 60% of the treasury over the next 12 months toward KONG Land’s mission, strategies to generate revenue, and explicit metrics to measure success.

The top 3 most crucial tasks that need attention regarding the DAO and it’s ability to continue to survive that I would like to see are:

The immediate recruitment of more $CITIZENs

While my proposal “Sunset Resolution” did the job of reviving the DAO from it’s dormancy, there remains a real risk of population collapse. Only roughly 12% of holders voted on the proposal, and it was the second most voted proposal in KONG Land history. Prior to that, we were only ranging roughly 5-7% of total holders taking part in governance.

Taking into account we will have multiple people participate in the ragequit mechanism, this further reduces the active population in KONG Land. We must begin a new initiative to recruit more $CITIZENs, and I’m not talking temporary membership via the green cards.

Fully decentralize or expand control over the @Kongiscash X account

The official X account was never accessible to $CITIZENs and has always been restricted to the founders. As of lately it has turned into Burner Land with an array of Burner related tweets, and the last KONG Land one being back in 2024. (Non-Sunset Resolution related)

Burner is a part of our surrounding ecosystem but it has never benefited KONG Land. It has no business being on the KONG Land X account when we’ve never seen KONG Land on the Burner account. Decentralizing the X allows for more relevant tweets and community control.

Establish and execute a way to generate revenue for the DAO

Quite possibly the most crucial of them all. Revenue inflow to the DAO will allow us to not only launch new campaigns and begin to grow the DAO again but also will return real value to the holders. The two most obvious things to do here I can think of right now are (A) significantly discount chips to $CITIZENs and/or (B) implement a KONG Land tax somewhere in the distribution flow. i.e. $CITIZENs become affiliates of Arx. Chip profits are split between Arx, the $CITIZEN, and the DAO.

[cameron]

Thanks @Digit for kicking this off and @fubuloubu @rj1708 @Sacris for feedback.

On Ragequitting:

• I think that defining the ragequit mechanism is the most important part of this resolution. It is clear from the vote that many $CITIZENs would have opted for dissolution (i.e exit) and so I think we should give them that option. I believe that attempting to bucket $CITIZENs into different categories is disruptive; I believe that regardless of participation anyone should be able to use their $CITIZEN token as a means of exit.
• I believe that we should treat ERC-721s and ERC-20 pari passu given that ERC-20s may still burn to become ERC-721. I believe that the outstanding $CTZN tokens held should be burned. The result would be slightly over 500 possible “ragequit redemptions” as $CTZN was allowed to join as ERC-721 $CITIZENs. The ERC-20 contract was extremely simple, so I do not believe it is possible to allow an ERC-721 → ERC-20 mint without deploying a new ERC-20 contract. I believe that a new intermediate ERC-20 contract might be desirable (that either variant of $CITIZEN can burn into and allows for traditional Moloch-style ragequitting against the treasury).

On Mission Refinement:

• I have understood there to be several takes on mission refinement:
  • Chip tooling / education / taxes (proposed by @Dr.Datamosh @Mattaglass @Digit @rj1708 )
  • Network state emphasis and global engagement (e.g. as proposed by @cadillion )
  • Other, e.g. anything as lightweight as a social club or as involved as making a chip. I’ve also considered a new POA KONG chain run on nodes only permissioned by chips ( me, @pmg )
• I believe that the greatest consensus around mission refinement is around chip tooling, chip education and chip taxes.
• I believe that moving treasury funds into yielding bearing assets would help to satisfy the “use [of] at least 60% of the treasury over the next 12 months” and that the costs of implementing tooling would not be a significant portion of treasury.
• Arx is willing to contribute discounted new chips as well as free (older variant but still very usable) HaLos to projects to achieve these goals.

On Other Items:

There are lot of “other” items that folks may be tempted to stuff into this proposal including management of the Twitter account, possible dissolution of the Senate, complaints about the Charter signature mechanism, etc. I do not believe those items should be legislated in this vote in order to ensure a ragequit mechanism is swiftly implemented.

As many of these “other items” seem to reflect a general discontent, I will also note that Arx bears significant hidden costs for management and infrastructure (e.g. this Discourse is $100 per month I believe, as well as kong.land hosting, etc) to the tune of thousands of dollars over the past few years. Arx has also payed out of pocket for significant costs like the 2024 ETHDenver embassy. Arx does not seek reimbursement here, but rather I note this so that any $CITIZEN concerned about “other items” might step up and propose a clear thought through plan for management that is actually decentralized. Merely critiquing how different aspects of KONG Land are run while at the same time failing to propose concrete alternatives isn’t constructive.

@Digit it would be helpful to clean up the markdown frame you have above by:

1. Narrowing down to a ragequit mechansim (vs. rageremain); I will continue to investigate a recommended solution here, however, I welcome other technical feedback (@fubuloubu )
2. Stating that:
   1. Frontend: “a volunteer or paid contributor from treasury funds”
   2. Arx Research: will provide a minimum X% discount from quoted retail pricing for KONG Land ($CITIZEN owned and run) projects for a period of 1 year from the completion of the DAO vote, with a mandated X% tax to be paid by the buyer to the KONG Land treasury [welcome to feedback here; I think we could also have a KONG Land “resale” dept but I am unsure how this will function distinctly from selling chips to end projects?]
   3. Treasury Strategy: 80% of treasury assets will be moved into yield bearing equivalents with no exit queue to ensure that ragequitting members may claim a portion of these assets in a liquid form.

I am also happy to include non-binding language relating to the network state portion in order to generate discussion here.

Update: After close review of the contracts, I have called the RevokeRoll function for minting $CITIZEN from the $CTZN-ERC20 contract in order to prevent further $CTZN-ERC20 tokens from burning into ERC-721s. This role can easily be re-enabled if desired, but it was last called 866 days ago (so no $CTZNs have minted to $CITIZEN for well over two years). Given the ragequit mechanism will enable burning for funds I felt it prudent to pause for the moment.

[Sacris]

To clarify, It is written in the proposal that a ragequit mechanism of some sort must be created if the proposal did not pass, not because a good portion of $CITIZENs opted for dissolution (i.e exit), so yes the option must be made available.

$CITIZENs have also always been categorized differently ever since $CTZN was created. There is a clear difference between Alpha $CITIZENs (who burned $CITIZEN token) and $CITIZENs who burned the $CTZN token. This difference isn’t disruptive, it was established since the beginning. I believe that regardless of participation anyone should be able to use their $CITIZEN ERC-721 as a means of exit, however, there needs to be a weight difference between the two. I believe to bucket both $CITIZEN token burners and $CTZN token burners together is more disruptive, especially when you look at how each were originally distributed.

I agree mission refinement should not include lots/any miscellaneous changes or updates. To avoid this, it should instead focus on solving 3 core pillars/aspects, even if it addresses these on a larger scale and not granular. I would propose that those are:

1. Arx future involvement in KONG Land/defining the DAO
2. Method of recruiting new $CITIZENs
3. Treasury strategy/revenue-bearing

Update: I also am resurfacing a previous graphic that shows the difference between $CTZN and $CITIZEN tokens for those who may be unaware or haven’t seen it.

[cameron]

$CITIZENs have also always been categorized differently ever since $CTZN was created. There is a clear difference between Alpha $CITIZENs (who burned $CITIZEN token) and $CITIZENs who burned the $CTZN token. This difference isn’t disruptive, it was established since the beginning. I believe that regardless of participation anyone should be able to use their $CITIZEN ERC-721 as a means of exit, however, there needs to be a weight difference between the two. I believe to bucket both $CITIZEN token burners and $CTZN token burners together is more disruptive, especially when you look at how each were originally distributed.

I agree mission refinement should not include lots/any miscellaneous changes or updates. To avoid this, it should instead focus on solving 3 core pillars/aspects, even if it addresses these on a larger scale and not granular. I would propose that those are:

1. Arx future involvement in KONG Land/defining the DAO

2. Method of recruiting new $CITIZENs

3. Treasury strategy/revenue-bearing

I adamantly disagree; there are 11 $CTZN that burned into $CITIZEN and I know several who have contributed more than most $CITIZENs. Happy to name them as well, but you can obviously see some here based on their ENS: Address: 0x9F3e2C43...73ef0C05a | Etherscan

I believe that pillars 1. & 2. are helpful discussions, but they sound massively open ended and prevent us from achieving the goal of proposing another vote on the two week timeline outlined in the original proposal. I would put both into the “other items” category I cited above;

I would be open to noting them in a refined mission statement without strict requirements (e.g. I would be opposed to stating that we should recruit at least XXX $CITIZENs, require that Arx do x, y and z).

[Sacris]

I would like more people to chime in so it’s not just you and me but I think this is a productive discussion. I thought we weren’t going to categorize based off contribution and when referring to the difference between $CTZN and $CITIZEN I was mainly referencing to how each were distributed and able to be acquired. You have to remember that (1) multiple $CTZN were airdropped to multiple $CITIZENs and (2) $CTZN was not $1,000+ as the $CITIZEN ERC-20 was. If we’re going to treat their ERC-721 version the same, then the $CTZN ERC-20s simply cannot be part of this ragequit mechanism for a multitude of reasons. Those being:

• $CITIZEN ERC-20/ERC-721 sales contributed to the majority of the treasury.
• $CTZN was airdropped widely among KONG Land and much easier to obtain, most often for free.
• If contribution is not going to play a role, then we should not reward free entrys with a paid exit (which makes me lean even more towards $CTZN ERC-20s and ERC-721 should not be included).

@cameron

I believe that pillars 1. & 2. are helpful discussions, but they sound massively open ended and prevent us from achieving the goal of proposing another vote on the two week timeline outlined in the original proposal. I would put both into the “other items” category I cited above;

Regarding pillars 1 & 2, the DAO overwhelming voted to continue KONG Land. Bringing in new members and defining the DAO itself, which includes how Arx may play a role is not only crucial but a necessity based off the recent vote. It is the responsibility of the DAO to figure these out now, even if it’s at a high level to meet the deadline, so we can uphold what many $CITIZENs just voted on.

[cameron]

I disagree that it’s crucial to demand that we must come up with a plan for recruiting new $CITIZENs and/or Arx involvement. Neither were directly mentioned in the “mission refinement” section for the vote. I am open to you proposing concrete language here that you would like to see in the proposal, but I do not believe it should be necessary.

Some tokens were acquired for far less than $1,000, some for far more ($CITIZEN was originally priced more like $200 as I recall? Maybe even less). I can say that Isaac, K, Chris and Daofren ($CTZN → $CITIZEN holders) have all contributed far more value than $1,000 each.

If there is a strong desire to weight $CITIZENs differently, I think there could be another avenue of distribution for ragequit, but I believe it has its own issues: using $LAND as the ragequit token. There was an initial $LAND airdrop with a second one planned; less than half of $CITIZENs claimed the initial airdrop, but it showed a bare minimum level of participation in the DAO at the time of the claim. There is also $LAND due for Senators as a portion held for early contributors.

I believe using $LAND as the ragequit token is fraught with many issues as opposed to using $CITIZEN directly, but, we could airdrop the remaining token to all $CITIZENs (721 and or 20) so that everyone has a claim. I have concerns about the $LAND amounts given to founders relative to $CITIZENs which would not be easily rectified.

We might also need to shift voting power to the $ERC-20 which would remove the 1-1 $CITIZEN/vote mechanism OR come up with some way to burn the $CITIZEN-721 at the same time as the $LAND ERC-20. There are probably other issues I haven’t considered.

I now imagine two paths in mind for a ragequit:

• ERC-721s burn into a new intermediate ERC-20 ($EXILE) which can make a claim on the treasury; ERC-20s may still burn into ERC-721s. There is some game theory here that might be suboptimal (it’s better to burn early to claim a larger part of the treasury). We could also disable the ability for ERC-20s to burn into ERC-721s; I am generally against this as I believe the original ERC-20s are still the easiest/most liquid way to become a $CITIZEN. But I know that other folks view the ERC-20s differently and would love to hear those thoughts.
• We use the $LAND ERC-20 noting the issues described above. Ragequitting will have an uneven distribution. There are some challenges around either changing how voting works (no longer 1-1) or ensuring that an ERC-721 must be burned in conjunction with the $LAND.

[cameron]

After some close evaluation of the existing contracts and options I believe that the most straightforward ragequit mechanism to implement would be as follows:

• A new ragequit-comptaible ERC-20 token, $EXILE would be created
• 511* $EXILE shares would be minted and placed into a claim contract
• Any $CITIZEN ERC-721 could claim their $EXILE share by burning their ERC-721
• $CITIZEN ERC-20s could still burn into ERC-721s, then burn into $EXILE to claim their exit share
• With an $EXILE token one could burn to receive their share of the treasury

*I propose 511 which represents the maximum number of $CITIZENs possible with the $CTZN → $CITIZEN minting frozen. 11 $CTZN burned into $CITIZEN.

Rationale

Using existing Moloch ragequit mechanisms would significantly decrease development time/risk. Removing ERC-721 tokens from circulation ensures that $CITIZENs who leave cannot continue to participate in governance which I believe is wholly appropriate.

Points for Discussion

I believe that ERC-20 token holders were issued a “right” to always burn into the ERC-721 and maintaining this right keeps a path to $CITIZENship open. I think there is disagreement on this point and welcome additional feedback. If we wish to end or pause this right then the ERC-20 → ERC-721 burn to mint function must be disabled.

Because the ragequit mechanism is a permanent one (e.g. not a one-time exit claim) I believe that any alteration of $CITIZEN ERC-20 capabilities is a significant one that can’t be considered lightly; disabling the burn to mint function would effectively cut these tokens off from the KONG Land ecosystem.

I also want to note that it would also be technically possible to limit the claim for $EXILE to the token IDs in the ERC-721 contract to those 500 and below (this would exclude the 11 $CTZN → $CITIZEN burners). I believe this would be unfair and punitive to a number of $CITIZENs who were active contributors in that bucket. I also believe that the dilution of 11 additional shares is minimal.

Lastly, we could devise a mechanism whereby $EXILE shares are not an even split but rather based off of $LAND holdings. In this case you would present both your $CITIZEN and $LAND holdings to the contract for burning to gain your $EXILE shares for exit.

@cadillion @rj1708 I would appreciate your feedback as I recall that both of you both (1) endorsed the ragequit mechanism prior to the dissolution vote and (2) had opinions on the shape of it that may not have been included in this latest thread.

[cadillion]

Re: ragequit

I agree the right method should be based on burning the NFT. IMO, if you never claimed the NFT and signed the charter after 4 years, you’re not an active voting member of the DAO and you have no rights. You never converted to a voter, and never used the tokens to recruit more people to the DAO. You just created a liquidity crunch and made citizenship harder to get for new members.

You shouldn’t get a share of the treasury for speculating. And if you feel you deserve payment for your efforts even though you never burned for the NFT, you should make a retrospective grant proposal rather than ragequitting. We want to keep you around!

As for a difference in payment between alpha NFTs and vanilla NFTs, I’m not in favor of differentiating here. As @cameron said, excluding 11 CTZN-721 from pro-rata changes your share by 2%. This is $8 per alpha if the whole 30 ETH in treasury is claimable. The simplicity is worth the trade-off.

$EXILE should just be an implementation detail, though I don’t see why you couldn’t time lock 12 ETH for a year (40% of the treasury) in a claim contract that accepts any CITIZEN-721 transfer for a pre-existing NFT-ID from the snapshot, returns the pro-rata share of 12 ETH/511 citizens, and then forwards the CITIZEN-721 to the burn address. The frontend experience should just be “burn NFT” → “claim ETH” if at all possible. Any unclaimed ETH at the end of 12 months reverts to the treasury.

Rather than turning off minting, imo ragequit should be locked to existing NFTs from the snapshot for the next 12 months. If new people want to get a 721 in the meantime, let them.

Re: mission refinement

Imo, the applications that have been most exciting for people have been offline crypto cash, SKUs, and proofs of network state membership. The concrete projects I would like to commit to building over the next year are:

1. a crypto-native point of sale application that accepts transactions from NFC hardware wallets, leveraging Burners
2. an end-to-end chain of custody application for delivery of real world assets, leveraging halos and ERS
3. a network state management system, leveraging passports and Agora

Any of these applications would be trivial to:

• assess a tax or transaction fee in the course of registering chips or transferring assets
• leverage infrastructure we’ve already built and invested in
• narrow our user personas for recruiting actual customers of the infrastructure

Re: the vote

It may be best to split this into two votes, one for ragequit mechanism and one for revenue product.

I propose that the ragequit mechanism be approval voted on as pro-rata to:

1. 511 CITIZEN-721
2. 500 ALPHA CITIZEN-721
3. All CITIZEN-20, CTZN-20, CITIZEN-721
4. snapshot CITIZEN-721
5. snapshot ALPHA CITIZEN-721
6. snapshot CITIZEN-20, CTZN-20, CITIZEN-721

I propose that the revenue product be approval voted on as:

1. No-code chip management & trusted service registry
2. Crypto-native point of sale & physical crypto cash
3. Delivery of real world assets & supply chain provenance
4. Network state management & reporting
5. Proof of asset L1 blockchain
6. Social club

[cameron]

@cadillion

$EXILE should just be an implementation detail, though I don’t see why you couldn’t time lock 12 ETH for a year (40% of the treasury) in a claim contract that accepts any CITIZEN-721 transfer for a pre-existing NFT-ID from the snapshot, returns the pro-rata share of 12 ETH/511 citizens, and then forwards the CITIZEN-721 to the burn address.

Oh, hmm, I don’t think this is a ragequit mechanism. This is a set aside. I understood a ragequit to be a full proportional share of liquid treasury assets at any given time moving forward, not a fixed share of funds set aside.

Agreed, $EXILE is indeed the implementation and we can simplify exit on this UI side, but it’s also worth noting that it’s where the technical limitations come into play (notably the contract that burns the ERC-721 in order to claim $EXILE).

I believe that if one wishes to exclude all but the current 281 $CITIZEN holders, that should be possible. The exit contract would only work for tokenId <= 281 with a maximum supply of 281 $EXILE (e.g. 281 exit shares). ERC-20 → ERC-721 burns would be allowed, but imo they would be rendered permanently second class $CITIZENs with no option to claim treasury.

This could be mitigated by some delay function that you note, e.g. the exit contract starts with 281 shares but then after 12 months another 230 shares are minted any any $CITIZEN can exit. Of course this again creates a weird game theory incentive to burn and exit now, acquire an ERC-20 and just wait.

I agree that we may need to split out the ragequit vote (in effect) from a deeper mission oriented vote as there are many factors at play here.

[cadillion]

Either way, you can put all the treasury in the claim address, and give the DAO multisig withdrawal access on the claim contract, but there are still adverse incentives to spend as much of the 60% of the treasury in advance of the 12 month deadline so that ragequit doesn’t diminish the spending power of the DAO. I’m happy to put all 30 ETH in the ragequit contract, this is just an example implementation.

I favor the tiered system where late NFT claims lose ragequit privileges for at least one year (even indefinitely), as there were some people trying to game the system by buying tokens to burn after the snapshot was taken.

That said, I’m happy to put that up to a vote too

[Sacris]

Thanks @cadillion for jumping into the discussion. I am aligned with your view of only the ERC-721s should be available to take part in the ragequit mechanism. All ERC-20s should not be able to participate, $CTZN and $CITIZEN, to your point that they had no intention of taking part in the DAO if they haven’t burned and signed the charter at this point.

I would propose to exclude all but the current 246 unique $CITIZEN ERC-721 holders as no $CITIZEN should be able to burn twice. It may also be possible to not have to disable the ERC-20 → ERC-721 burn to mint function and instead simply use the Snapshot taken by @cameron earlier or a more recent one as $CTZN has not been burned in a long time.

To the $LAND aspect, while it was originally meant to be a method for distributing payout to DAO contributions, it never was truly distributed in that way. Most $LAND was used as a general airdrop to $CITIZENs. To encompass all contributors and DAO participants in a better way, we should also include KONG Land POAP count and # of previous Snapshot votes along with $LAND holdings. This would be a very easy addition considering this information is tracked in our Agora portal (if I remember correctly).

[cameron]

@cadillion

• 511 CITIZEN-721
• 500 ALPHA CITIZEN-721
• All CITIZEN-20, CTZN-20, CITIZEN-721
• snapshot CITIZEN-721
• snapshot ALPHA CITIZEN-721
• snapshot CITIZEN-20, CTZN-20, CITIZEN-721

I would refine this a bit; here are the ragequit mechanisms I would propose we put up to vote:

1. 281 Citizen ERC-721 and 230 potential ERC-721 (511 shares total, available as soon as technically feasible) may ragequit immediately.

2. 281 Citizen ERC-721 (281 shares total; tokenId <= 281 or tokenId 1,000-1,011) may burned immediately; after one year 230 potential additional shares will be added (511 shares total after one year) to accommodate $CITIZENs who have burned into the ERC-721. Any tokenId up to 500 or from 1,000-1,011 would be eligible to burn at this point.

For the sake of simplicity I would not split hairs over the 11 $CITIZENs who burned from $CTZN, nor would I focus on multiple $CITIZEN ERC-721 holders or use any frozen snapshot as this fundamentally breaks the notion of a ragequit.

For example, if a $CITIZEN wishes to transfer their NFT the day after the vote, then the subsequent holder should be eligible to ragequit (or if they transfer the NFT because they worry their account was compromised they shouldn’t be excluded based on some snapshot).

Likewise dealing with holders who have multiple $CITIZENs is technically very difficult and breaks the fungibility of ERC-721s. A holder with 2x $CITIZENs in one account could resell one to an unsuspecting $CITIZEN who would forever be excluding from ragequitting (creating a permanent second class of $CITIZENs).

I would not include $CTZN ERC-20 holders who never burned as they never had any economic risk to participate in KONG Land (their tokens were gifted for free) and they had ample opportunity to burn.

[Sacris]

Putting it out there that it is still worth preventing the gamification of the burn mechanism by having multiple ERC-721s and to not be complacent. One idea is to go off the latest snapshot and limit a single ERC-721 burn per address. That restriction would unlock post 1 year along with the addition of the 230 potential new ERC-721s.

• If a $CITIZEN has transferred their NFT post-snapshot, they send it back to the original address that was holding it.
• A compromised account is an edge case, as the $CITIZEN should have already transferred it before the recent snapshot.
• If they’re reselling to a new $CITIZEN it is highly unlikely they will want to ragequit within the 1 year restriction, also an edge case.
• Prevents the larger issue which is multiple wallets holding multiple ERC-721s and specifically (you know who you are) buyer who recently bought because of the news.

[grin]

Agreed with @Sacris that the recent sales are clearly someone anticipating the ragequit and should be excluded.

Agreed with @cadillion on a fixed-amount ragequit. We’re committed to spending 60% of the treasury to further the Kong Land mission, so only 40% is available for ragequitting. If you exit, I believe you should get 1 share of that 40%. And even if the 60% was not already earmarked for other things, I on principle believe that a ragequit should get you less than 1 share of the treasury.

@cameron I hear you on Moloch’s ragequit being the classic design. But I see that as the first version, not the final word. We don’t have to do exactly what they did (though I agree that reusing their contracts if we can is a good idea).

Also agreed with @cadillion on a fixed timeframe for the ragequit. 12 months sounds fine. I’d also support a shorter window (6 or even 3 months).

I’m agnostic about the onchain implementation of all this. Y’all know that stuff better than I do.

[cameron]

One idea is to go off the latest snapshot and limit a single ERC-721 burn per address. That restriction would unlock post 1 year along with the addition of the 230 potential new ERC-721s.

One ERC-721 burn per address is meaningless unless we also lock transfers for 1 year.

@grin

We’re committed to spending 60% of the treasury to further the Kong Land mission, so only 40% is available for ragequitting. If you exit, I believe you should get 1 share of that 40%. And even if the 60% was not already earmarked for other things, I on principle believe that a ragequit should get you less than 1 share of the treasury.

Hmm this is not how I believe how the term ragequit was understood by all. I believe it always means that you get to walk away with your full share of the liquid treasury, hence I suggested it as a fair alternative to those who wished to leave as opposed to dissolution. I don’t believe the ability for KONG Land to set a budget should apply an arbitrary tax here (60% in this case). I would love to hear other takes on this.

[Sacris]

@cameron

One ERC-721 burn per address is meaningless unless we also lock transfers for 1 year.

Can’t we limit it to the however many holders there were at the time of your Snapshot? Only those addresses would be eligible and they would only be able to burn 1 per address. This limit could lift with the introduction of the other potential ERC-721s in ~a year.

I’m not going to be too pushy on this but if we allow multiple claims per address then we’re going against an original KONG Land ethos of 1 person = 1 $CITIZEN regardless of how many NFTs they hold. It’s why the highest voting power is 1 and why, I think, the claim should be limited to 1.

@cameron

Hmm this is not how I believe how the term ragequit was understood by all. I believe it always means that you get to walk away with your full share of the liquid treasury

Agreed. Re: proposal

“Mission refinement: Ex. Clear goals and a path forward established for the DAO, plans to use at least 60% of the treasury over the next 12 months towards KONG Lands mission, and/or a way to generate revenue for the DAO and the establishment of explicit metrics to evaluate success.”

I don’t think the ragequit mechanism has to be limited to only 40% of the total treasury.

[cameron]

Can’t we limit it to the however many holders there were at the time of your Snapshot? Only those addresses would be eligible and they would only be able to burn 1 per address. This limit could lift with the introduction of the other potential ERC-721s in ~a year.

The only solution I can come up with is to hard code a set of XXX token ids [edit: I don’t know how many double holders there are] from the snapshot. For those with multiple tokens we would arbitrarily select a token id from the list of what an individual holder owns. I don’t want to propose this token id selection as I’m personally not keen on this approach, but I welcome others to do this analysis and believe we can implement it if desired.

I appreciate the feedback/desire to prevent claims for anyone except active/burned/single holder $CITIZENs, but the gamification potential is still really large. By focusing 281 or less shares for a year, one should burn their $CITIZEN today and then rejoin in a year. Or they should burn and then acquire another ERC-20 $CITIZEN, burn and could immediate re-enter the DAO and start voting (even if they cannot burn again).

The only way to prevent this is by (1) allowing 511 shares upfront – whether or not $CITIZEN ERC-20s can exit immediately or (2) freezing the DAO to the 281 tokens/230 holders and ignoring all other $CITIZENs permanently.

I believe that unfortunately the desire to remove speculators could backfire terribly by creating a repeating cycle of this problem in 1 year.